Despite Reform UK’s pledge to withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights, the Dan Thomas case shows why human-rights-based privacy law remains important.
On 16 September 2026, it was reported that Dan Thomas had resigned as Reform UK’s leader in Wales after being arrested on suspicion of assault and controlling or coercive behaviour, allegations which he denies. This article examines the law on privacy and considers how it applies to the case.
Understanding privacy law in England and Wales
Privacy law in England and Wales — usually described by lawyers as the law on misuse of private information — protects a person from unjustified intrusion where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In broad terms, the law asks whether the person had such an expectation and, if so, whether the intrusion was nevertheless justified, for example because publication was in the public interest.
If the intrusion cannot be justified, the person affected may be able to claim compensation for the harm caused and, in some cases, seek an injunction to stop or prevent further intrusion.
But the right is not absolute as an intrusion might be justified as being in the public interest. It is especially important in journalism, where publishers may argue that exposing information about a person’s private life is justified because the public has a legitimate interest in knowing it.
How human rights shaped privacy law
Privacy law in England and Wales is a relatively recent common-law development. Although created by judges, it has been shaped by the Human Rights Act 1998, which gave domestic effect to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Two ECHR rights are central in privacy cases: article 8: the right to respect for private and family life; and article 10: the right to freedom of expression. Neither right is absolute. When article 8 and article 10 conflict, the court must balance them and decide which should prevail.
The precedent: comparing Thomas and Sicri.
The first issue is whether Dan Thomas had a reasonable expectation of privacy after his arrest. Established case law suggests that he did. Alaedeen Sicri v Associated Newspapers Limited is a useful comparison. The High Court ordered the MailOnline to pay £83,000 after it identified Sicri as someone arrested following the Manchester Arena bombing. He was later released without charge. Sicri argued that publication breached his privacy because, at the pre-charge stage, his identity should not have been published without lawful justification.
The court held that people under police investigation normally have privacy before charge because an investigation is intrusive, an arrest is not a formal allegation and the presumption of innocence remains central; after charge, however, the position usually changes because open justice becomes a significant factor and the person can normally be named.
In Sicri, the MailOnline argued that the seriousness of the Manchester Arena bombing justified identifying him under article 10 of the ECHR. The court rejected that argument. Balancing Sicri’s article 8 privacy rights against the MailOnline’s article 10 rights, it held that the public interest did not justify naming him before charge.
Dan Thomas was arrested on suspicion of serious criminal misconduct. He has not been charged and was bailed pending further investigation. He may never be charged. On that basis, he was entitled to assert that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy, either personally or through his supporters.
Nation.Cymru described the assertion of privacy as an attempted ‘cover-up’. That framing is open to criticism. As Thomas has not been charged with an offence, he was entitled to argue the case for his right to privacy, and doing so was not, in itself, improper.
The headline’s use of inverted commas may indicate that Nation.Cymru recognised the contested nature of that description. A clearer approach would have been to acknowledge Thomas’s ordinary entitlement to privacy, then argue that publication was nevertheless justified by the public interest arising from his then senior political position.
The comparison with Sicri
Thomas and Sicri were initially similar: in both cases, article 8 was engaged because the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy before any charging decision.
The cases then diverge. In Sicri, the High Court balanced articles 8 and 10 and held that Sicri’s privacy rights outweighed the MailOnline’s freedom of expression. In Thomas’s case, no court had to undertake that exercise because he publicly confirmed his arrest when announcing his resignation.
Had he not confirmed the arrest, however, a publisher could still have argued a stronger public-interest case than in Sicri. Thomas held senior public roles as Reform UK’s leader in Wales and leader of the main opposition party in the Senedd, which would have strengthened the case for reporting if he had remained in office, although a court would still have had to balance that public interest against his privacy rights. His resignation and confirmation of the arrest appear, albeit belatedly, to recognise the strength of the public-interest argument.
Conclusion: privacy and the public interest
The Thomas case shows human-rights-based privacy law in action: Thomas had a legitimate expectation of privacy over his arrest, while the media had a public-interest story engaging freedom of expression. Before he confirmed the arrest, news outlets appear to have respected his privacy claim; had he not disclosed the arrest and resignation himself, a court might have had to balance those competing rights.
Any such balancing exercise would likely have turned on Thomas’s public role. A private individual’s privacy would probably have carried greater weight, but Thomas’s senior political positions made the public-interest case for publication much stronger, adding obvious irony — perhaps hypocrisy — to his supporters’ reliance on article 8 privacy rights while Reform UK pledges to leave the ECHR if elected to UK office.
The case also highlights two wider points. First, the ECHR protects everyone, including those who support Reform UK. Secondly, public-interest journalism has constitutional value: the law recognises freedom of expression as a human right and allows public-interest defences that may justify intrusions into privacy which would otherwise be unlawful. Journalistic codes – such as the IPSO and Impress codes – reinforce that balance.
More from Dr Huw Evans
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